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I. Introduction
In 2002, the United States and M6xico, acting through the
International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), signed
Minute No. 308 as a partial solution to the dispute over M6xico's
water debt on the Rio Grande. This groundbreaking agreement
committed both parties to investments in water conservation on
the Rio Grande drainage, recognized the need for additional
institutional reforms to strengthen the sustainable management of
Rio Grande treaty waters, and called for a bi-national conference,
planned for 2005, to identify and recommend changes to boundary
water management.
Minute 308 is the strongest official recognition of the need for
fundamental changes to the treaty system dominated by the 1944
Water Treaty. The 1944 Water Treaty has served the two nations
well by providing a basis for peaceful resolution of most water
management problems on the border. Yet, strains to the treaty
system have been building for over a decade, driven by drought
t Professor of Political Science, Colorado State University. Ph.D., University of
Arizona, 1982.
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and rising demands on border water resources. Most observers
agree that treaty compatible reforms are feasible by working
within the current formal and informal mechanisms, With surface
water disputes dominating the bilateral water agenda, much of the
proposed innovation centers on enhancing the IBWC's authority to
develop policy, encourage public participation, and assist
subnational agencies in managing boundary river water. Bilateral
border environmental cooperation, the bi-national Border
Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC) and its financial
partner institution, the North American Development Bank
(NABD), have also drawn reformist concern. It is useful to review
the options for improving the IBWC's performance with reference
to these various programs and institutions concerning border water
management.
II. IBWC Targeted Reforms
Criticism of the IBWC is almost as old as the Commission
itself. Over the past sixty years, the Commission, particularly its
U.S. Section, has been attacked for numerous grievances.
Complaints include U.S. intrusion on national sovereignty,
unnecessary duplication of functions of domestic water
management agencies, the adoption of an overly technical and
politically narrow interpretation of treaty-based responsibilities,
use of an ad-hoc approach to dealing with problems and disputes
falling within the scope of its official mandate, and failure to
respond to local constituencies. By contemporary standards, the
IBWC is deficient in various areas, ranging from the adequacy of
its mandate to administration and operational procedures.
Centered on the task of protecting national treaty water
endowments, the IBWC was, and arguably remains, poorly
positioned to address contemporary water management concerns
or to promote an agenda of sustainable development of border
water resources. The Commission, however, is also praised as a
model of institutionalized bi-national cooperation.1 It is the lead
agency for transboundary water management and the settlement of
bilateral disputes relating to managing shared water resources. For
this reason, it is useful to review and evaluate the options for
I Joseph Friedkin, Rio Grande Water for Peace, ENGINEERING NEws-REc., Jul. 27,
1967, at 33-37.
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improving the Commission's watershed management capabilities
in the border area starting with the most pressing controversies.
A. The Rio Grande Water Debt
The current reform recommendations arise from disagreements
over treaty water management along the border.2 The most
prominent dispute, the Mexican water debt, highlights the 1944
Treaty's ambiguity on the question of border-wide drought and the
larger problem of watershed management. The 1944 Treaty deals
only with the two principal transboundary rivers: the Rio Grande
and the Colorado and, by extension, certain aspects of the
management of their tributaries and drainages. The immediate
complications in the Mexican water debt dispute arise from the
region-wide drought affecting the Rio Grande basin as far back as
1992 and the treaty's ambiguous Article 4 provisions for
managing drought on the river's mid-lower reach.3
Article 4 stipulates that Mexico must, over a period of five
consecutive years, deliver a minimum annual average of 350,000
acre-feet of water from its Rio Grande tributaries to the United
States.4 If an extraordinary drought prevents Mdxico from
supplying that volume, a debt to the United States may be rolled
over and paid in the next five-year cycle. This rollover does not
excuse Mexico from its obligation to deliver the 1.75 million-acre
feet (maf) required during this second cycle. Any Mexican debt is
entirely forgiven when U.S. storage capacity in the two uppermost
dams, Falcon Dam and Amistad Dam, is reached, triggering the
start of a new five-year accounting cycle. The treaty is silent,
however, as to when and how a state of extraordinary drought is
to be formally determined. It also makes no provision for a debt to
be rolled over beyond a second cycle. These lacunae, it turns out,
greatly complicate arriving at a cooperative solution.
2 See infra Table 1 for a brief comparison of some of the more prominent
suggestions.
3 See Mary Kelly & Alberto Szekely, Modernizing the International Boundary
and Water Commission, Policy Paper No. 1, Univ. of Calif. at Berkely Center for Latin
American Studies, (2004); see also Albert E. Utton, Overview: Symposium on
Anticipating Transboundary Resource Needs and Issue in the U.S.-Mexican Border Area
to the Year 2000, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 735 (1982).
4 Treaty Regarding Utilization of the Waters of Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and
of the Rio Grande, Feb. 3, 1944, U.S.-Mex., 59 Stat. 1219 [hereinafter 1944 Treaty].
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Table 1. Recent IBWC Reform Proposals Compared
Recommended
Institutional Kelly & Szekely5  Schmandt6  NitzelGemstar7
Change
* Eliminate Engineer-
Commissioner requirement
* Elevate border water issues at Create new second
Commission level of the foreign ministries Commissioner
Executive * Enhance authority of USIBWC responsible forLiaison integrated river basin
0 Reinstate General Directorate management
of Int'l Boundaries and Waters at
Mexican Foreign Ministry
" Establish Joint IBWC/CILA Create two ad hoc Provide add'i
office-emulating BECC committees for drought resources for technical
Staff/Agency o Coordinate data gathering, management and financing as "sticks
Organization/ outreach, and technical aspects groundwater and carrots" for
Budget of project design. management with akdr
* Review staff capabilities short-term advisory engagement in
* Increase budget mandate waee 
p s
watershed processes
* Require joint notification and Create bi-national Rio
consultation on any project or Grande Basin council Create bi-national
Authority for modification affecting basin with two tasks: 1) stakeholder councils
Watershed hydrology or stream flow basin wide water for each watershed
Management * Provide for the Commission to planning and; 2) along the border
function as Secretariat for other designing water
_advisory bodies and stakeholders improvement projects
o Establish Scientific
Advisory Board to Rio
Grande Basin council.
* Establish four
Advisory Boards Establish joint Basin councils regional water taskforces: Paso del Norte;
Conchos-Pecos;
International
Reservoirs; and Lower
Rio Grande
Water management
actions undertaken by Ensure that BECC and
IBWC Rio Grande NADB are
Policy Basin Council and incorporated in the
Integration Task Forces to be pncrpatdin the
reviewed by BECC for policy planning and
Sustainability and support process
NABD for funding
5 Kelly & Szekely, supra note 3.
6 Jurgen Schmandt, Bi-national Water Issues in the Rio Grande/Rio Bravo Basin,
4 WATER POL'Y 135, 152-53 (2002).
7 William A. Nitze, Draft: The Role of Climate Change in Water Management in
the U.S.-Mexico Border Region: A Challenge for the BECC, the NADB and Other Bi-
national Institutions (Nov. 9, 2004) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
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In the present instance, when Mexico fell in arrears at the end
of the 1992-1997 accounting cycle, the United States agreed to
rollover the debt as provided in Article 4. Unfortunately, even
though drought conditions were present and clearly effected the
programming of Mexican water deliveries, no formal agreement
was reached over whether the Mexican arrears were provoked by
this extraordinary drought.8 In 1999, with precipitation still below
average and a Mexican arrears still on the books, M6xico formally,
and unilaterally declared an extraordinary drought. In its formal
declaration, Mexico argued that the extraordinary circumstance in
essence freed Mexico from its formal obligation under Article 4,
though it would try to meet its obligations and restore normal
deliveries as soon as Mother Nature cooperated. The United
States responded that M6xico's position was unacceptable and that
Mexico was bound by Article 4 provisions.
In 2002, the United States, with M6xico's concurrence, agreed
to rollover the debt to a third consecutive cycle. Mexico viewed
its obligation at this point as an obligation in comity, and as a
moral, rather than legal, obligation owing to the continuing
drought and its 1999 declaration. The United States claimed
significant damages to its downstream agriculture, rejecting
Mexico's argument that the debt was in abeyance and denying that
Mexico's interpretation of the extraordinary drought language
was correct. The United States further produced evidence that
M6xico may have withheld available water in tributary storage to
meet domestic needs even though the Treaty obligation is arguably
the highest priority on the river, superseding domestic ordinances.
The two countries, with the assistance of foreign ministries,
continued to manage the situation through the IBWC diplomatic
process. In 2002, in IBWC Minute 308, the two countries agreed
to invest funds in upstream water conservation that would improve
Mexico's water use efficiency. This agreement provided, as first
priority, that saved water would revert to the river for satisfying
M6xico's treaty obligations.9 In the meantime, Mexico agreed to
8 Mexico took the position that the U.S. government had virtually conceded that
an extraordinary drought prevailed at the end of the 2 5th accounting cycle in October
1997, arguing that if this were not the case, the United States would have accused
Mexico of defaulting on its treaty obligation at the end of the 25 th cycle. Kelly &
Szekely, supra note 3, at 12-13.
9 United States Allocation of Rio Grande Waters During the Last Year of the
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
continue to try to pay down the debt as a matter of comity and to
meet its cyclical obligation in the new cycle consistent with
Article 4 provisions. In 2004, it had significantly increased its
inputs to the river and paid down nearly seventy-five percent of its
remaining debt while meeting current cycle obligations. ° The
prospect that M6xico might actually top off United States storage
capacity in the dams, vacating all existing debt and triggering a
new cycle, seemed to worry Texan state interests, which were
claiming treaty based damages in the earlier cycles. In December
2004, South Texas irrigators filed a claim for $500 million (USD)
in damages under NAFTA's Chapter 11, alleging that Mexico's
failure to meet its treaty obligations was related to Mexican
hoarding of tributary water.1 The plaintiffs allege this treaty water
was used to raise agricultural export products, which unfairly
impacted Texan agricultural investments and resulted in an
effective taking of property under NAFTA provisions. Whether
this novel argument will hold remains to be tested by a NAFTA
dispute resolution panel.
Regardless of the merits in this dispute, the case itself points to
a number of Treaty-based shortcomings related to drought
management that must be addressed. These mandate
shortcomings include the need to: (1) define ambiguous language
in the water treaties, (2) better articulate and enhance the role of
the IBWC in this area, particularly in relation to the
responsibilities of domestic agencies, and (3) elaborate both staff
capabilities and citizen and professional advisory functions related
to watershed management. A brief word on each of these
elements is required. Treaty architects and analysts foresaw the
problem of extraordinary drought. Not only does the term appear
in Article 4, but it is also found in Article 10 where it is applied to
a different context, the Colorado River. The term itself derives
from the 1906 Water Treaty dealing with the upper Rio Grande's
Current Cycle, IBWC Minute No. 308 (June 28, 2002), available at
http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Files/Minutes/Min308.pdf.
10 Elizabeth Pierson, Mexico Chips Away at Water Debt While U.S. Tries for
Another Payment, TI-E BROWNSVILLE HERALD, Jul. 11, 2004, available at
http://www.rioweb.org/Archive/jss8-wbr071104.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2005).
11 Tom Nicolette, Valley Growers Target Mexico in Water Dispute, TEX. AGRIC.,
Sept. 17, 2004, at 1, available at http://www.txfb.org/TexasAgriculture/200 4 /0917 04/
091704waterdispute.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2005).
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waters-now linked to the 1944 Water Treaty through the IBWC's
mandate to administer the U.S.-Mdxico boundary and water
treaties. Fortunately, the 1944 Treaty is not an obstacle here.
While it failed to define these terms (which contributed to the
present difficulties), it also provides a process for extrapolating bi-
national interpretation of the treaty. This process, known as the
Minute Process, by which the IBWC interprets and extends the
Treaty to deal with particular implementation problems, requires
the consent of the foreign ministries but otherwise imposes no
further requirement for Treaty approval. Where appropriations are
required to comply with new agreements, of course, national
legislatures come forcefully into play. The Minute process is
entirely adequate to reach a new bi-national understanding on the
interpretation of the extraordinary drought language in the 1906
and 1944 Treaties.
In addition, the concept of cycles, referenced in Article 4 of
the 1944 Treaty, ought to be better defined as well. In 1969,
nearly a quarter century after the 1944 Water Treaty was signed,
IBWC Minute 234 gave effect to the current system of cycles - the
delay in doing so occasioned by the need to complete the
hydraulic infrastructure on the Rio Grande.12 Unfortunately, at this
time no effort was made to anticipate the need to extend debt
payments beyond a period of two consecutive cycles or to further
elaborate how debt payments might be made in the context of
these cycles. Arguably, the term "cycles" and its application
should be better defined to enable the two countries to articulate
their domestic water management practices to meet Treaty
obligations and to better understand the nature of national
obligations in meeting cyclical obligations.
The water debt crisis has also drawn attention to the limits and
inadequacies of the IBWC's current structure. Various critics and
commentators have recently argued that the Commission's
executive structure, staff capabilities, and public advisory process
should be modified or strengthened. The IBWC's executive
structure is in some respects unique, certainly by comparison to
other bi-national water management agencies. Under Article 2 of
12 Waters of the Rio Grande Allocated to the United States from the Conchos, San
Diego, San Rodrigo, Escondido and Salado Rivers, and Las Vacas Arroyo, IBWC
Minute No. 234 (1969).
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the Treaty, the Commission is comprised of two national sections.
Each section has a Commissioner with ambassadorial status who
by Treaty must be a licensed engineer, as well as two Principal
Engineers, a Secretary, and a Legal Advisor.13 Commissioners are
presidential appointees and are officially accountable to chief
executives through the foreign ministries of each country. The
1944 Treaty does not stipulate any other aspect of each Section's
organization. As a result, the two national sections have evolved
somewhat differently. The United States Section has built up a
substantial engineering-construction division, and the Mexican
Section has deferred to other federal agencies for these functions.
Critics note that this structure is highly centralized, with a
strong technical bias that may limit the agency's diplomatic
flexibility and responsiveness to public constituencies. 4  Such
criticisms have acquired greater force in an era in which the
Commission's work has shifted from infrastructure development
to management of a broad range of problems, some of which were
not anticipated by the 1944 Treaty, as well as accommodating a
wider range of stakeholders. The fact that the Commissioners
oversee both operational and diplomatic functions may be viewed
as a crosscutting directive. Some analysts are now calling for
treaty modifications that either eliminate the Treaty requirement
that the Commissioner be a licensed engineer or establish a second
Commissioner in each national section whose primary
responsibility would center on watershed management and
constituency relations. 5 These same analysts would also like to
see the Commission invested with new operational responsibilities
for coordinating watershed management functions in the main-
stem and tributary treaty rivers. 6 They point to the organization
and functions of the International Joint Commission (UC), whose
Windsor, Ontario Secretariat oversees and has recently added
additional Water Management Boards on key transboundary
watersheds along the U.S.-Canada border. Additional staff
13 1944 Treaty, supra note 4.
14 Helen Ingram & David R. White, International Boundary and Water
Commission: An Institutional Mismatch for Resolving Transboundary Water Problems,
33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 153, 155 (1993).
15 Schmandt, supra note 6, at 152-53; Kelly & Szekely, supra note 3, at 12-13.
16 Schmandt, supra note 6, at 155.
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capability would be added to buttress the IBWC's capabilities in
the area of watershed management.
Complimentary institutional reforms would extend to the
public advisory and constituency-stakeholder process. Borrowing
from the IJC's practice on the Great Lakes and U.S.-Canada
transboundary river basins, critics argue the IBWC should take on
a bi-national Scientific Advisory Board. They also push for
adding bi-national Water Management Advisory Boards, Councils,
or Task Forces dealing with the major rivers and supplementing
these, most likely, with tributary level task forces or public
advisory boards. 17 Critics also advance an argument for joining
the operations of the two national sections in a single office to
improve bi-national coordination and consultation.' 8
Aside from modifying the Commission's formal executive
structure, much of this is possible within the scope of the Treaty
and requires only the consent of the governments and sufficient
budgeting to give such changes effect. While the Treaty's formal
specification of executive structure is fixed and politically
unalterable, there is nothing in the text that precludes adding on
additional surface water management functions should the
governments agree to do so. Indeed, some elements of these
reforms are already in motion, though not yet on a bi-national
basis. In 1999, the U.S. Section elaborated its first border-wide
Strategic Plan,'9 a document that commits the Section to
advancing sustainable development and certain components of
watershed management.2 °  In the context of these strategic
objectives, the U.S. Section proceeded to organize six Citizen's
Advisory Boards for key transboundary rivers, streams and
sections of streams that impact the border. These watershed
boards are not fully comprehensive and fall short of what might be
expected of a full-scale watershed advisory board structure. In the
last decade, the U.S. Section has also significantly enhanced its
staff capabilities for environmental protection, water quality, and
public affairs. Most recently, the U.S. Section's new
17 Id. at 152-53.
18 Kelly & Szekely, supra note 3.
19 See infra Table 2.
20 IBWC, U.S. SECTION, STRATEGIC PLAN, (Dec. 2000), available at http://www.
ibwc.state.gov/html/strategic-planning.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2005).
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Commissioner, Arturo Duran, has reorganized the agency's
operations on a regional basis that arguably might be better
adapted or extended towards a watershed orientation to surface
water management. Commissioner Duran has also controversially
reorganized the U.S. Section's Commissioner's Office to
incorporate more recent administrative roles and functions in that
office including a public affairs officer, a state government liaison,
and federal regulatory functions while assigning the two principal
engineers the responsibility of overseeing operations and
engineering functions. 2' This approach seeks to modernize the
older structure by rearranging and combining the Treaty mandated
offices with newer, treaty compatible functions at the U.S.
Section.
21 Press Release, IBWC, U.S. Section, Commission Changes Prepare Agency to
Address Border Needs (Sept. 20, 2004), available at http://www.ibwc.state.
gov/PAO/CURPRESS/2004/CommishChangesWeb.pdf.
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Table 2: USIBWC Strategic Goals and Objectives 22
Goal No. 1: Transboundary Cooperation
I. Partner with other entities to carry out border groundwater investigations in support of
regional sustainable development efforts which balance the needs of the riparian ecology and the
human population.
2. Partner with other entities to develop and implement water marketing and transfer approaches
for dealing with water quantity and quality questions.
Objectives 3. Coordinate the exchange of expertise, technology, and other information within the IBWC
and other entities to provide a more global approach to the IBWC's int'l coordination and
problem solving role.
4. Cultivate regional and int'l stakeholder support using proactive communication.
5. Partner with other entities in int'l problem prevention and resolution.
Goal No. 2: Boundary Preservation
I. Preserve, demarcate, and delineate the land boundary in an effective, innovative, and cost-
effective manner that is responsive to stakeholders.
2. Preserve and delineate the river boundary and demarcate its ports-of-entry in a manner that
balances the riparian ecology with human activities and incorporates advanced cost-effective
Objectives technology that is responsive to stakeholders.
3. Delineate the land and river boundary on maps in an innovative and cost-effective manner
that is responsive to stakeholders and complies with the 1970 Treaty, Article 2, Part C., river
mapping requirement.
4. Establish a boundary-wide Global Information Systems (GIS) to manage data.
Goal No. 3: Water Resources Management
1. Incorporate stakeholder input, new tracking and forecasting technology, and a visionary U.S.-
Mxico environmental policy with flood control activities.
2. Renovate water data gathering, exchange, and accounting activities to accomplish more time-
sensitive scenarios that incorporate current technology and methodology in support of
stakeholder needs.
3. Operate river system structures, utilizing new technology and methodology in concert with
Objectives other entities in a manner that is responsive to stakeholders and the riparian ecology.
4. Develop innovative approaches to water quality improvement and border sanitation problems.
5. Carry out studies and negotiations to reach agreement on the magnitude of the criteria flows
and on the technical criteria for acceptability of proposed constructed works within the criteria
flow floodplain in both countries as required under Article IV-B of the 1970 Boundary Treaty.
Procure the resources necessary to apply these technical criteria within the criteria flow
floodplain in the United States in a manner that supports both limited development and
maintenance of the riparian habitat.
Goal No. 4: Agency Resources Optimization
1. Value human resources through organizational development initiatives, including
development and empowerment of personnel and promotion of a quality culture.
2. Analyze and establish priorities for agency programs and initiatives in concert with int'l and
domestic mandates (legal and policy).
Objectives 3. Align budget, performance, and organization to move towards achieving strategic goals and
ensuring accountability to stakeholders.
4. Apply a strategic management approach to the integration and delivery of the agency's
engineering, construction, operations, maintenance, foreign affairs, and administrative support
functions.
5. Maximize stakeholder participation in existing/future IBWC programs and projects.
B. Ecological Uses
In addition to this menu of modifications to the IBWC's
current mandate, a range of critics, including this writer, have
22 These informal changes, remain exclusive to the U.S side of the border. Mexico
has not yet produced a strategic plan of its own or informally altered much of its existing
agency structure.
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called for enhancing the priority bestowed by the Treaty on
ecological uses of water. 3 The question of ecological uses has
cropped up most forcefully in the Colorado River delta region but
is highly relevant for bi-national efforts to conserve habitat and
biodiversity in other regions of the border as well. Conserving
riparian ecology is now very much on the bi-national radar screen
in the Tijuana river basin, the New River-Salton Sea, the river
basins of the Sonoyta, the Santa Cruz, and the San Pedro, and
along the various reaches of the Rio Grande. Without going into
detail, the problem here is simply the 1944 Treaty's failure to
mention the importance of ecological uses, as in the priority
framing language of Article 3 consigns these in-stream flow
questions to the least priority category of "all other beneficial
uses."
24
In the case of Colorado delta riparian conservation, pressed by
a bi-national alliance of environmental organizations and
university based scholars, the two countries agreed in Minute 306
in August 2000 to create a bi-national task force to study the water
requirements of the Delta ecosystem and to continue bi-national
discussions on the topic.2 5 The issue was controversial enough that
the IBWC's authority to do this was linked to the 1970 Boundary
Treaty's mandate for channel rectification and maintenance, not
the 1944 Water Treaty. Given the intensity of current demands on
the Colorado River, there is little doubt that any linkage of
ecological uses to the 1944 Treaty will continue to be highly
controversial.
C. Groundwater Management
Groundwater remains another serious concern. Analysts of
23 Stephen P. Mumme, The Case for Adding an Ecology Minute to the 1944 United
States-Mexico Water Treaty, 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J., 239, 256 (2002).
24 Id.
25 See Conceptual Framework for United States-Mexico Studies for Future
Recommendations Concerning Riparian and Estuarine Ecology of the Limitrophe
Section of the Colorado River and its Associated Delta, IBWC Minute No. 306 (Dec. 12,
2000), available at http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Files/Minutes/Min306.pdf (last visited
Mar. 6, 2005); Peter W. Culp and Robert J. Glennon, The Last Green Lagoon: How and
Why the Bush Administration Should Save the Colorado River Delta, 28 EcOLOGY L.Q.
903, 992 (2002); Jennifer Pitt et al., Two Nations, One River: Managing Ecosystem
Conservation in the Colorado River Delta, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 819, 864 (2000).
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border water management have long called for strengthening the
Commission's formal role in groundwater management along the
border. 6 At least one model treaty has been written with this end
in mind.27  Yet, there has been little progress on bi-national
groundwater management since 1973 when Minute 242, the
"Permanent and Definitive" solution to the Salinity Crisis,
endowed the Commission with a small role in groundwater
governance and provided for mandatory bi-national consultation
on any public or private initiative that would materially affect the
groundwater balance at the international border.28 Increasing
reliance on groundwater for municipal and industrial uses on the
border has raised the potential for bi-national conflict over this
resource. In at least one instance, the case of the All-American
Canal in California's Imperial County, the issue has already risen
to the cause celebre level.29
While scholars and activists have steadily called for concerted
bi-national effort to negotiate agreements on bi-national
groundwater management as envisioned by Minute 242, little has
occurred to improve the overall situation in the past quarter-
century. This may change, as the advent of the BECC has drawn
attention and resources to the needs of urban water management
along the border. This, in itself, harbors potential for designing
and implementing groundwater management solutions along the
border. The Mexican Section of the IBWC has also been quietly
championing the idea of a framework agreement for groundwater
26 See Stephen P. Mumme, Minute 242 and Beyond: Challenges and Opportunities
for Managing Transboundary Groundwater on the Mexico-U.S. Border, 40 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 341, 361 (2002); Cesar Sepulveda, Los Recursos Hidraulicos en la Zona
Fronteriza Mexico-Estados Unidos: Perspectiva de la Problematica Hacia el Ano 2000-
Algunas Recomendaciones, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1081, 1089 (1982); Utton, supra note
3, at 745.
27 Robert Hayton & Albert E. Utton, Transboundary Groundwaters: The Bellagio
Draft Treaty, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 663, 720 (1992).
28 Permanent and Definitive Solution to the International Problem of the Salinity of
the Colorado River, IBWC Minute No. 242 (Aug. 30, 1973), available at http://www.
ibwc.state.gov/Files/Minutes/Min242.pdf.
29 Lara A. Cortez, El revestimiento del Canal Todo Americano y el Valle de
Mexicali: iequilibrio estatico de mercado o equilibrio de Nash?, enfoques encontrados
en la gesti6n de recursos hidrdulicos compartidos, in EL REVESTIMIENTO DEL CANAL
TODO AMERICANO: COMPETENCIA 0 COOPERACION POR EL AGUA EN LA FRONTERA MEXICO-
ESTADOS UNIDOS? (M. V. Sdnchez ed., 2004).
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management on the border that would provide both political cover
and a technical context for engaging local stakeholders in bi-
national negotiations on the management of particular basins.3"
This would certainly be compatible with the watershed
management functions that have also been advanced on the agenda
of IBWC mandate reform.
In sum, a number of mandate changes have been proposed that
directly center on the IBWC. Many of these proposed changes are
feasible within the terms of the existing water treaty system and
remain primarily contingent on government support. A further
concern, however, is with the IBWC's capacity to better articulate
its mission and capabilities within the evolving complex of bi-
national programs and other agencies with water mandates on the
border. To understand these possibilities, it is useful to consider
how the La Paz process and BECC and NADB now engage the
IBWC in managing surface water as well as water quality along
the border.
D. The La Paz Process and Border 2012
In August 1983, the U.S.-M6xico Border Environment
Cooperation Agreement, better known as the La Paz Agreement,
ushered in a new era of formal bi-national consultation and
heightened attention to environmental problems in the border
region, particularly those with a clear bi-national component. The
La Paz Agreement stipulates that "nothing in this Agreement shall
prejudice or otherwise affect the functions entrusted to the
International Boundary and Water Commission, in accordance
with the Water Treaty of 1944.,,3' A decade after La Paz, with the
NAFTA debate reshaping the bi-national policy agenda, the La
Paz process was strengthened, first with the 1992-1994 Integrated
Border Environmental Plan, followed by the 1995-2000 Border
XXI Program, and, since 2000, the Border 2012 Program.
These successive programs had several important effects on bi-
national water management at the border. First, they gradually
30 Arturo Herrera, Presentation to the Water and Society on the U.S.-Mexican
Border Symposium, CENTER FOR U.S.-MEXICAN STUDIES, UNIV. OF CAL. SAN DIEGO
(2005).
31 Agreement Between the United States of America and the United Mexican
States on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the
Border Area, Aug. 14, 1983, U.S.-Mex., T.I.A.S. 10827.
[Vol. 30
2005] DEVELOPING WATERSHED MANAGEMENT REFORMS 943
refrained and broadened the context and supporting rationale for
border water management, extending the scope of border water
management to include pollution prevention, water quality
management, a concern for ecological processes, and, after 1992, a
concern for advancing sustainable development of water resources
along the border. Working in tandem with the IBWC on a range
of water quality issues, starting with the problems of sewage spills
into the Tijuana River and copper tailing spills on the San Pedro
River, the environmental ministries of the two countries gradually
elaborated an agenda for water quality management that was
border-wide. Second, they drew on a larger range of interests,
redefined as stakeholders, and provided new venues for bi-national
discussion and cooperation. Third, they afforded a rationale for
greater federal financial investment in water management at the
border, with resources flowing through the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and Mexico's Secretaria de Medio
Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (SEMARNAT), the BECC and
NADB, and national public health ministries. These changes,
taken as a whole, have been transformative. They envelop the
older treaty based procedures and establish a new dynamic in
border water management.
As befits a bi-national framework for environmental
cooperation that espouses greater institutional and civic inclusion,
the La Paz process has been closely scrutinized and criticized
since its inception. At the outset, it was seen as a largely ad hoc
decision making process that failed to prioritize or adequately
budget for needed solutions to border environmental problems. It
was also criticized for federal domination of the process, despite
its formal validation of state and municipal governments and non-
governmental civic organizations as legitimate stakeholders in the
process. Under the Border XXI Program, which raised the priority
accorded the border environment by the governments, water
management was incorporated as one of the program's nine
functional policy domains and received the greatest level of
federal financial support of any of the nine sectors. Individual
projects associated with Border XXI Water varied widely, ranging
from training water professionals in water management operations,
to monitoring water quality in particular localities, to
characterizing groundwater resources in transboundary aquifers.
Most of the Border XXI investment in the water sector, however,
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
centered on BECC certified projects and project proposals in the
border region which were developed in an ad-hoc manner. In
short, basic criticisms of the La Paz Process persisted.
The latest program iteration, the Border 2012 Program,3 2 aims
to dispel such criticism by reorganizing and decentralizing the La
Paz process away from federally dominated sector organization in
favor of a more regional and localized series of workgroups and
task forces. At the border-wide level, a new water policy forum
under the guidance of the environmental ministries, will seek to
prioritize and address bi-national issues through the use of federal
resources. The environmental ministries (officially identified as
National Coordinators) may then create regionally based task
forces to deal with a range of locally identified environmental
concerns, including water matters. These task forces are to be as
"representative as possible" of all potential stakeholders in the
area.
The notion driving this change is not only to decentralize
decision-making but also mobilize local resources for local
solutions to water-based problems. While the La Paz process and
Border 2012 acknowledge the IBWC's historic treaty role in bi-
national water planning, and IBWC will certainly participate in its
Policy Forums and Regional Workgroups, at present it remains
unclear just how these new local task forces will interact with the
IBWC groups and other local initiatives bearing on watershed
management at the border. The Border 2012 task forces are cross-
sectional and multi-media organizations that may, in principle,
incorporate water concerns. Just how they will coordinate with
IBWC's new Citizen's Advisory Councils for bi-national
watersheds has not been resolved. Nor is it certain just yet how
these task forces will interact with Mexico's river basin councils,
consejos de cuencas, on the border. These several representative
bodies appear to have somewhat overlapping functions and
concerns that need to be better coordinated if they are to evolve in
the direction of generating a more coherent framework for bi-
national watershed management on the border. Ideally, the two
countries should try to build on the treaty system and the La Paz
32 BORDER 2012: U.S.-MEXICo ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAM, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY No. 160R03001 (2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/
usmexicoborder/intro.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2005).
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process to bi-nationalize these advisory and coordinating bodies in
watershed management, moving in the direction of the river basin
councils for watershed management and strategic planning of
border water resources. In principle, this is a treaty-compatible
reform that could be formalized through the IBWC's minute
procedure and supplemented by the La Paz Agreement's annex
procedure.
E. BECC and NADB
Since its advent in 1994, the BECC-NADB duo has become an
important player in border water management and the principle
source of new capital investment in border water infrastructure.
33
Situated in Ciudad Juarez, the BECC is structured as a truly bi-
national agency, a single organization with representation of both
countries at the board, managerial, and advisory levels.34  It
explicitly calls for sustainable development in the border area and
has drawn much praise for its institutional commitment to building
local capacity for sustainable development, public participation,
and the transparency and openness of its operations. Its technical
assistance to needy communities and certification procedures for
project approval has significantly improved local capabilities for
accessing needed water infrastructure along the border.
Today, the BECC's problem remains one of articulating other
needed reforms in border water management. The agency has a
close working relationship with the national environmental
ministries, and the IBWC currently is an ex-officio member of its
board of directors. The BECC has also established close working
relationships with the border states of the two countries.35
However, despite its mandate for sustainable development of
border water infrastructure, the BECC's operations proceed
project-by-project and are not yet driven by a specific strategy.
Although recent mandated expansion beyond urban water
infrastructure enhances the BECC's authority to support a broader
33 Mark Spalding, The NAFTA Environmental Institutions and Sustainable
Development Along the U.S.-Mexico Border in SHARED SPACE: RETHINKING THE U.S. -
MEXICO BORDER ENVIRONMENT (L. Herzog ed., 2000).
34 BORDER ENVIRONMENT COOPERATION COMMISSION AND NORTH AMERICAN
DEVELOPMENT BANK, JOINT STATUS REPORT, (Dec. 31, 2004), available at http://www.
cocef.org.
35 Id.
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range of watershed management projects, it has the potential, in
the absence of strategic planning, to further complicate this
situation. The BECC and NADB managers are both conversant
and committed to cooperating in any way they can with the La Paz
process and see themselves contributing to its aims. Gaps still
remain that warrant further attention, particularly if the two
countries are to move in the direction of developing formal
procedures for watershed management at the border.
Challenges facing the BECC in capacity development and
stakeholder participation include finding ways to sustain project
social capital, civic voice, and community leadership to other
policy repertoires associated with watershed management. To
date, the BECC has centered its efforts on providing opportunity
and stimulus for civic participation in project design and
development. While it perceives this process as growing civic
capacity, it has not sought to support or sustain civic groups
beyond project completion or to facilitate a process of linking
these water project activists with other stakeholder groups and
advisory bodies to border institutions. The point is certainly
arguable, but building networks and linkages is certainly a
function BECC can and should facilitate as a process of
community empowerment and capacity building for border-wide
sustainable development.
Another element worthy of debate is whether BECC's
technical assistance and certification procedures should be
modified to favor projects that directly contribute to watershed
management.36 At present, in the absence of an institutional
mandate to this effect, the agency officially treats each project on
its own merits. In principle, projects enhancing water
conservation and sustainable use of water resources serve the
broader aims of border watershed management, and such uses
would certainly be factored into considerations bearing on project
approval (certification). However, there is little guarantee in the
present process that such projects would be favored, fast-tracked,
or otherwise privileged for financial assistance and approval. To
date, the BECC has not worked closely with the IBWC, or other
federal and state level water management agencies, on an agenda
36 Nitze, supra note 7.
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for watershed management in the border area.37  Greater
integration of agency effort is certainly possible in the interest of
improving bi-national cooperation in watershed management.
Another cause for concern is the pending board merger the
BECC faces with its institutional partner, NADB.38 The recent
reforms at the BECC and NADB create opportunities for greater
synchronization of effort but also present critical challenges.
Passage of House Report 254 in April 2004 facilitated mandate
expansion at the BECC and NADB, enhanced NADB's lending
authority, and provided statutory authority for a merger of the
boards. Since then, NADB, implementing drought mitigation
commitments in IBWC Minute 307 dealing with the Rio Grande,
has proceeded to fund a portfolio of water conservation projects in
the Conchos River headwaters and in South Texas. As some
critics have noted,39 these reforms may enhance agency capacity to
address identified needs in border watershed management as well
as cope with regional phenomenon like climate change. However,
it is also noteworthy that these projects went forward independent
of BECC review and with little direct stakeholder participation
apart from federal water agencies and the irrigation districts
directly involved. While the urgency of the drought situation was
obvious and the deployment of NADB's underutilized resources
may have been reasonable, this does not appear as careful or
thorough a stakeholder process as would likely have occurred if a
watershed management protocol was in place. It would also
unlikely have passed muster at the BECC. As the two boards
merge, many observers in the border community are seriously
concerned that BECC's sustainable development procedures will
be diluted and fear losing an important source of influence on
border water policy in the absence of new institutional
mechanisms responsive to citizen concerns.
III. Integrating the IBWC in Border Watershed Management
In sum, there is much that can be done to address
shortcomings in the current bi-national water management
37 Id.
38 Andrea Abel, The Monterrey Commitments: What they Mean for the
Environment; AMERICAS POL'Y, Mar. 28, 2002, at www.americaspolicy.org.
39 Id.
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framework. Most of the proposed reforms outlined above are
treaty-compatible and would not require fundamental changes to
the present set of agreements governing U.S.-M6xico cooperation
on water management. What needs to be stressed is that treaty-
compatibility does not mean political feasibility. As the ongoing
case of the Mexican water debt shows, important differences in
national perspective are bound to drive the dynamics of
cooperation on all these issues. Cooperation will be especially
difficult where altering extant formal mechanisms is concerned,
since these mechanisms are tied to national endowments and
development options.
While reinforcing the Treaty architecture is critical at this time,
it is also true that the two countries need to focus more on how the
various institutions with mandates for water management at the bi-
national, national, state, tribal, and local levels coordinate
responses to regional water challenges. The growing consensus in
favor of a watershed approach to bi-national water management
requires a greater degree of formal articulation between existing
agencies than in the past. As the drought question reminds us,
such innovation runs squarely up against the limits of sovereignty.
But lawsuits and post-hoc recriminations, even recuperation of
financial damages, will not in themselves enable the two countries
to anticipate and plan for future water shortages. These shortages
are likely to occur more frequently considering the rising demand
on the region's water supply. The good news is that our existing
institutional arrangements can be modified in ways that should
enable them to meet the needs of future generations while also
sustaining our common ecological endowment. This can be
accomplished without impairing the sovereign entitlements to the
region's water resources established by hard-won treaties.
Additionally, the political momentum to move in this direction on
both sides of the border seems to be gaining strength.
The IBWC remains critical to this process. Right or wrong, it
is still the institutional mechanism charged with implementing the
U.S.-Mrxico boundary and water treaties and resolving treaty
related disputes between the two countries. However, the
Commission's two national sections remain embedded in the
domestic administrative and political processes of their respective
governments and are not really able to push significant reform
initiatives independent of government support.
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Within the limits of political feasibility, the IBWC has made
some institutional progress in the last decade. It has tentatively
and cautiously endorsed research on the Colorado River Delta
ecosystem, which partially legitimizes the importance of
considering ecological uses of treaty water at the bi-national level.
By participating on the BECC's board, it has become engaged in
matters that extend beyond its narrow treaty water turf. Both
national sections openly proclaim a commitment to sustainable
development of water resources, though this has yet to be
formalized under the Treaty. The national sections have gone
even further, with the U.S. Section officially endorsing a new
strategic plan4" and establishing citizens boards while the Mexican
Section quietly lobbying for bi-national cooperation in managing
shared groundwater.
If the Rio Grande tributary water dispute has a silver lining, it
is that it has generated additional political interest in strengthening
institutional mechanisms for water conservation and management
that should enable the governments to support a broadening of the
IBWC's role in watershed management. This will require moving
even further away from the Commission's highly restricted
jurisdiction in treaty water management to the point of engaging
the Commission more directly than ever with national and state
water management agencies. The IBWC has the Treaty authority
and a base of technical expertise that could be elaborated and
reinforced in a treaty compatible manner to enable it to better
diagnose boundary water supply and demand trends, issue
conservation advisories, and serve as an intergovernmental locus
for drought emergency response discussions and responses to
other acute water supply problems affecting the two countries.
In support of these functions, the governments should follow
recent advice and establish bi-national watershed boards for the
Treaty rivers (Rio Grande, Colorado, and Tijuana) that represent a
full range of government and non-governmental stakeholders in
treaty water management. These watershed boards should be
supplemented with either permanent or ad hoc scientific advisory
capability, along the lines of recent practice of the UC on the U.S.-
Canada border. An effort should be made to coordinate
representation on these boards with citizen representation on
40 See supra Table 2.
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boundary river consejos and other citizens advisory functions for
border watersheds, as well as with the water forums, workgroups,
and relevant task forces established under the La Paz process. The
two countries should also consider striving for agreement on a
strategic management framework for boundary water management
that either incorporates shared groundwater or creates separate
framework agreements for managing surface water and
groundwater. Each of these frameworks should stipulate the inter-
governmental responsibilities of bi-national, federal, and sub-
national agencies in data collection, operations, and financing.
Insofar as new infrastructure is needed to implement strategic
commitments, such projects should be vetted through the BECC's
certification procedures to ensure compatibility with bi-national
sustainable development goals.
All of this is a tall order; but everything proposed here is
Treaty-compatible if the governments choose to support it.
Hopefully, the de facto bi-national water planning discussions for
the Rio Grande envisioned under Minute 308 will push the two
countries to make better use of the IBWC for watershed
management in the 21st Century.
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